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CLOSING THE GAP BETWEEN WHAT IS LAWFUL AND
WHAT IS RIGHT IN POLICE USE OF FORCE
JURISPRUDENCE BY MAKING POLICE DEPARTMENTS
MORE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
Jonathan M. Smith*
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the com-
mon law, than the right of every individual to the possession and con-
trol of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.
—Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Botsford1
I can’t breathe.
—Eric Garner2
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1. 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
2. Eric Garner died on July 17, 2014, on the streets of Staten Island, New York, after
having been placed in a chokehold by police. He was being arrested for selling loose untaxed
cigarettes. The arrest and his death were captured on cell phone video by a bystander, which was
widely released by the media. As he was dying, Garner can be heard on the video repeatedly
saying, “I can’t breathe.” Joseph Goldstein & Nate Schweber, Man’s Death After Chokehold Raises
Old Issue for the Police, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/19/
nyregion/staten-island-man-dies-after-he-is-put-in-chokehold-during-arrest.html.
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INTRODUCTION
On August 9, 2014, Michael Brown was shot to death in Ferguson,
Missouri, by police officer Darren Wilson.3 Members of the Ferguson
community rose up in response.4 Protests demanding that police violence
against African Americans cease and that accountability for police miscon-
duct be addressed erupted across the country, and they have not subsided
since.5 Incidents in Baltimore, Maryland;6 Chicago, Illinois;7 Waller
County, Texas;8 and elsewhere have kept the movement alive. The mass
media, the political elite, and the White middle class woke up to a reality
that had been long known to communities of color – force is used dispro-
portionately against people of color, and this has caused a breakdown in
trust between the police and the communities they serve.9
There are many causes for this breakdown in trust.10 Police officers
are the faces of a criminal justice system that has dramatically dispropor-
tionate negative effects based on race and economic status. Practices like
stop-and-frisk11 and broken windows policing12 have put people of color
3. Department of Justice Report Regarding The Criminal Investigation Into The Shooting Death
Of Michael Brown By Ferguson, Missouri Police Officer Darren Wilson, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar.
4, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/
04/doj_report_on_shooting_of_michael_brown_1.pdf.
4. See Emily Wax-Thibodeaux & DeNeen L. Brown, Ferguson protesters: The peaceful, the
elders, the looters, and the ‘militants.’, WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/politics/ferguson-protesters-the-peaceful-the-elders-the-looters-and-the-militants/2014/
08/18/d6be1262-26f3-11e4-8593-da634b334390_story.html.
5. See Wesley Lowery, On policing, the national mood turns toward reform, WASH. POST
(Dec. 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-policing-the-national-mood-
turns-toward-reform/2015/12/13/1174ef1e-a03f-11e5-a3c5-c77f2cc5a43c_story.html.
6. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Crowds Scatter as Baltimore Curfew Takes Hold, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/29/us/baltimore-riots.html.
7. Tony Briscoe, Crowds shrink, but protesters say they won’t stop push for police reforms, CHI.
TRIB. (Dec. 12, 2015, 8:15 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-la-
quan-mcdonald-police-protests-met-1211-20151210-story.html.
8. David Montgomery, New Details Released in Sandra Bland’s Death in Texas Jail, N.Y.
TIMES (July 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/us/new-details-released-in-san
dra-blands-death-in-texas-jail.html.
9. See PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, OFFICE OF CMTY.
ORIENTED POLICE SERVICES, FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST
CENTURY POLICING 1 (2015) (“Trust between law enforcement agencies and the people they
protect and serve is essential in a democracy. It is key to the stability of our communities, the
integrity of our criminal justice system, and the safe and effective delivery of policing services.”).
10. See id.
11. Stop-and-frisk is a practice used by some urban police departments and consists of
police-initiated pedestrian stops followed by pat-down searches of the person stopped for weap-
ons or contraband. The indiscriminate use of stop-and-frisk has been credited with creating
significant hostility between police and communities of color. NANCY G. LA VIGNE AT AL.,
OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., STOP AND FRISK: BALANCING CRIME CON-
TROL WITH COMMUNITY RELATIONS 1, 9 (2014), http://-inc.com//-pub.pdf.
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in hostile contact with law enforcement on a daily basis. The imposition of
excessive fines and court fees in some communities has created severe
criminal consequences often for traffic or other minor offenses.13
These practices have driven a wedge between the police and those
most likely to be policed. When federal civil rights investigators entered a
Cleveland, Ohio, police substation, they found a sign that read “Forward
Operating Base.”14 The investigators noted that “[t]his reference to a mil-
itary outpost in enemy territory was posted in the station’s vehicle bay.”15
The sign, in a graphic way, illustrates that far too often both police and
communities believe that law enforcement is a hostile occupying force.
A significant factor in this mistrust is that police conduct is infre-
quently reviewed, and as a result, police officers and police departments are
not held accountable for abuses. Judicial decisions are responsible, at least
in part, for substantially eroding the protections provided by the Constitu-
tion against the excessive use of force by police.16 As is demonstrated be-
low, the Fourth Amendment is increasingly interpreted as creating very
limited rights for persons subjected to the use of force by police. Moreo-
ver, the Supreme Court has constructed procedural barriers, including
strict standing rules and qualified immunity, to make judicial review of
police practices difficult.17 The Court has placed outside of judicial review
12. Broken windows policing is based on the theory that serious crime is generated where
there is general disorder and lawlessness. By strictly enforcing minor violations, police create
order and disrupt crime. “Broken windows” were seen as symbolic of the general disorder that
was addressed by the practice. Matthew C. Schneider, Broken Windows and Community Policing,
CMTY. POLICING DISPATCH (Jan. 2009), http://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/January_2009/
nugget.htm; see also George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The police and neigh-
borhood safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Mar. 1982).
13. See Loretta E. Lynch, Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch Delivers Remarks at White House
Convening on Incarceration and Poverty, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 42 (Dec. 3, 2015), http://www
.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-loretta-e-lynch-delivers-remarks-white-house-conven
ing-incarceration-and; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DE-
PARTMENT 42 (2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2015/03/04/fer
guson_findings_3-4-15.pdf.
14. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF THE CLEVELAND DIVISION
OF POLICE 6 (2014), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/
2014/12/04/cleveland_division_of_police_findings_letter.pdf.
15. Id.
16. As is discussed in Part I below, the jurisprudence on the use of force has evolved
substantially to reduce the protection the Constitution provides to individuals in encounters with
police. The Supreme Court found unconstitutional the shooting of a fleeing suspected burglar in
the 1985 case of Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), but fewer than thirty years later author-
ized deadly force against a suspect who attempted to flee from a traffic stop for an equipment
violation in Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014).
17. The Supreme Court has held that there must be a “robust consensus” in the case law
that places the “statutory or constitutional question beyond debate” before an officer can be held
liable. San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774, 1778 (2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-
Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011)). The question must be subjected to an “exacting standard,”
and the legal precedent must be “sufficiently definite.” Id. at 1774. Thus, a litigant, to be success-
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police conduct that communities perceive as excessive and that erodes the
trust between these communities and law enforcement officers.18 The
Court’s jurisprudence in this arena has created a substantial gap between
what is lawful and what is right.
Moreover, criminal prosecutions, which are critical for individual ac-
countability, are rare19 and thereby fail to hold police institutions account-
able for systemic failures. As the law tilts heavily in favor of officers,
prosecutors are reluctant to charge and juries are hesitant to convict.
Civil and criminal legal actions that create police accountability are
instrumental to reform. However, it is inherently insufficient to address the
national crisis in policing. This Article will describe the jurisprudential and
practical limits to relying on the civil and criminal legal processes to con-
trol police behavior and create accountability and will offer recommenda-
tions on the need to democratize police departments through transparency
and robust community oversight. Part I will explore barriers to private
civil litigation and to criminal prosecutions in achieving reform. Part II
will offer recommendations on measures to ensure that police departments
are responsive to a meaningful democratic process that can overcome some
of the failures of the current systems of accountability.
I. THE ILLUSION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S PROTECTION
AGAINST THE UNREASONABLE USE OF FORCE BY LAW
ENFORCEMENT CREATES BARRIERS TO CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Police are given both extraordinary powers and extraordinary re-
sponsibilities. They are among the few public officials authorized by law to
ful, must be able to point to a case of nearly identical facts to prevail. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95 (1983) (holding that the plaintiff could not seek prospective relief to prevent the use of
chokeholds unless he could show that he was likely to be subjected to a chokehold again); see also
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 322 (1988) (“Our cases reveal that, for purposes of assessing the
likelihood that state authorities will reinflict a given injury, we generally have been unwilling to
assume that the party seeking relief will repeat the type of misconduct that would once again
place him or her at risk of that injury.”).
18. The failure of the prosecutors in Cleveland, Ohio, to prosecute the shooting death of
twelve-year-old Tamir Rice is but the latest example of a case caught on video that shocked the
community but has avoided criminal prosecution. Timothy Williams & Mitch Smith, Cleveland
Officer Will Not Face Charges in Tamir Rice Shooting Death, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/12/29/us/tamir-rice-police-shootiing-cleveland.html?_r=0; Ryllie
Danylko, Tamir Rice Supporters Protest in Downtown Cleveland in Response to Grand Jury Decision,
CLEVELAND.COM (Dec. 29, 2015), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2015/12/tamir
_rice_supporters_block_tr.html.
19. Of the approximately 1,000 deaths from officer-involved shootings in 2015, fewer
than twenty have been prosecuted. Kimberly Kindy, Marc Fisher, Julie Tate, & Jennifer Jenkins,
A Year of Reckoning: Police Fatally Shoot Nearly 1,000, WASH. POST (Dec. 26, 2014), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/12/26/a-year-of-reckoning-police-fatally-shoot-
nearly-1000/. The failure of prosecutors to pursue police-involved shootings is discussed in
greater depth in Part I.C below.
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routinely use force in the course of their duties. The execution of stops
and arrests “necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of
physical coercion or threat thereof to affect it.”20 The right to use force,
while broad, is not unlimited. The Fourth Amendment21 established the
right of “people to be secure in their persons” and to be protected from
“unreasonable searches and seizures,” and as discussed below, it has long
been understood to create boundaries on the use of force by law
enforcement.
For much of the history of this Nation, courts have remained silent
on the Fourth Amendment’s meaning in the context of the use of force.
Beginning in the late 1960s and continuing to the 1980s, the Court an-
nounced a series of decisions that created the foundational doctrines to
assess when and how the courts should analyze claims of excessive force
and how the Constitution’s protections should be viewed as limits on po-
lice powers. These cases, however, were the high watermark in protecting
individuals from officers’ use of excessive force. The Court’s more recent
decisions have been less generous to individual rights and have instead con-
verted the Fourth Amendment from a tool to protect the civil liberties of
individuals to a shield from liability for law enforcement.22
The next section discusses the landmark decisions expanding the pro-
tection of individual rights. It will then review recent cases that have sub-
stantially eroded those rights. Each group of cases—those expanding
individual rights and those giving broad license to the police—are the
product of their times. The first set was issued in the wake of the civil
rights movement, while the latter set was issued in the era of mass incarcer-
ation and the War on Drugs.
20. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
21. The Fourth Amendment states, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
22. Every significant use of force case heard by the Supreme Court in recent terms has
found either that the conduct of the officer was objectively reasonable or that the officer was
entitled to qualified immunity. See, e.g., Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 306, 312 (2015)
(finding that shooting driver of car engaged in high-speed chase reasonable although less lethal
strategies to stop car were available); City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1769,
1771, 1778 (2015) (holding that shooting woman with mental illness alone in her room in a
group home does not create liability); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2017-18, 2022-23
(2014) (determining that shooting driver of car pulling away from police officers after temporary
cessation of high-speed chase where the driver had initially been stopped for a broken headlight
does not create liability).
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A. The Creation of the Right to be Free From the Unreasonable Use of Force
by Law Enforcement
Terry v. Ohio23 was the first in a string of cases that placed meaningful
limits on the police’s power to use force. The Terry Court recognized that
any police restraint on movement, including a mere stop that does “not
eventuate in a trip to the stationhouse and prosecution for a crime” impli-
cates the Fourth Amendment.24 A stop25 even without an arrest is a seizure
that constitutes “a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which
may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be
undertaken lightly.”26
The Terry decision was issued in 1968, against the backdrop of urban
social unrest, which had a clear influence on the Court. The Court’s opin-
ion expressly noted that unrestrained police power to stop and restrain in-
dividuals “can only serve to exacerbate police-community tensions in the
crowded centers of our Nation’s cities.”27 In July 1967, the inner cities of
Detroit and Newark experienced unrest, rebellion, and rioting that spread
to other cities with similarly high concentrations of African-American
poverty.28 In seeking recommendations to address the underlying condi-
tions that led to this unrest, President Johnson appointed the National Ad-
visory Commission on Civil Disorders, led by Illinois Governor Otto
Kerner, later known as the Kerner Commission.29
23. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
24. Id. at 16.
25. Significantly, Terry separately analyzed the Fourth Amendment implications for the
stop and the frisk, noting that each required separate justification. A stop can be made when
there is a reasonable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal activity. Id. at 21 (“[I]n
justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articul-
able facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion.”). However, an officer may only engage in a frisk where “a reasonably prudent man in
the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others is in danger.”
Id. at 27. Far too often, police treat the frisk and an integral part of the stop, ignoring the
distinction drawn in the cases. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). The “reasonable suspicion” standard articulated in Terry has been diminished
in subsequent Supreme Court cases. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (holding
that reasonable suspicion can be justified on a “totality of circumstances”).
26. Terry, 392 U.S. at 17. Some scholars argue that the Terry decision itself gives police
too much power, but in contrast to the cases that follow, Terry is a significant civil liberties
victory. See, e.g., Craig Menchin, Why NYPD Terry Stops Are More Problematic Than You Think, 8
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 299, 301-02 (2012).
27. Terry, 392 U.S. at 12.
28. KERNER COMM’N, THE KERNER REPORT: THE 1968 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (Pantheon Books 1988) (1968) [hereinafter
KERNER COMMISSION REPORT].
29. Exec. Order 11,365, 32 C.F.R. 11111 (Aug.1, 1967). The Executive Order gave the
Commission the following charge to investigate and to make recommendations about the
following:
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The Kerner Commission issued its now iconic report one year
later.30 The report examined the effects of police practices and housing
and employment discrimination, as well as the persistent effects of racial
segregation.31 Police and criminal justice practices were especially scruti-
nized in the report. The Commission concluded that, to many, police had
come “to symbolize white power, white racism and white repression.”32
The Commission famously warned: “Our nation is moving toward two
societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal.”33
The two decades following the Terry decision were a period of social
transformation. The Court continued to recognize that liberty interests
were significantly impacted by police conduct and that the Fourth Amend-
ment protections against the seizure of a person without cause must be
preserved. The Court held that even the most limited restraint was subject
to protection and that a seizure occurs at the moment a person is not free
to leave.34 Nevertheless, police officers are not restrained from approaching
or posing questions to a person on the street; “[a]s long as the person to
whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk
away, there has been no intrusion upon that person’s liberty or privacy as
would under the Constitution require some particularized and objective
justification.”35
The Court also recognized that even when authorized to detain or
arrest a person, the amount of force officers were permitted to use is sub-
ject to Fourth Amendment review. The Court first meaningfully addressed
the appropriate amount of force when it examined the circumstances in
(1) The origins of the recent major civil disorders in our cities, including the basic
causes and factors leading to such disorders and the influence, if any, of orga-
nizations or individuals dedicated to the incitement or encouragement of
violence.
(2) The development of methods and techniques for averting or controlling such
disorders, including the improvement of communications between local au-
thorities and community groups, the training of state and local law enforce-
ment and National Guard personnel in dealing with potential or actual riot
situations, and the coordination of efforts of the various law enforcement and
governmental units which may become involved in such situations;
(3) The appropriate role of the local, state and Federal authorities in dealing with
civil disorders; and
(4) Such other matters as the President may place before the Commission.
Id. at 11111.
30. KERNER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 28.
31. Id. at 7-16.
32. Id. at 11.
33. Id. at 1.
34. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S.
721 (1969).
35. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
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which an officer could use deadly force in Tennessee v. Garner.36 Garner, an
unarmed teenager, was shot while running away from a Memphis, Tennes-
see, police officer who was called to the scene of a suspected burglary.37
The officer relied on a State statute that permitted police to “use all neces-
sary means to effect the arrest” of a fleeing suspect and the common law
notion that deadly force was always justified to secure the arrest of a fleeing
felon.38
The Court struck down the use of the Tennessee statute to the extent
that it was being used to justify deadly force against nonviolent suspects.39
Deadly force, the Court held, is authorized only when:
the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a
threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to
others . . . . Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a
weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has com-
mitted a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction
of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary
to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has
been given.40
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on a line of cases man-
dating that the constitutional analysis “balance the nature and quality of
the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the
importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intru-
sion.”41 The Garner Court concluded that the question of how much force
is permitted is one of proportionality and requires a balancing of the harm
to the individual against the interests of the state.42 In the more recent
cases discussed below, the scales have tilted so far away from the individ-
ual’s interest such that it barely plays a role in the analysis.
Graham v. Connor43 extends the analysis developed in Garner to all
uses of force, not just to circumstances involving deadly force and fleeing
felons. The Court clarified that the Fourth Amendment limits the circum-
stances that justify a police officer’s use of force and the amount of force
that is reasonable in a particular circumstance.44 Referencing its decision in
Garner, the Court explained that the “‘reasonableness’ of a particular
36. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
37. Id. at 3.
38. Id. at 4-5 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-108 (1982)).
39. Id. at 10.
40. Id. at 11-12.
41. Id. at 8.
42. Id. at 7.
43. 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
44. Id. at 396.
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seizure depends not only on when it is made, but on how it is carried
out.”45
The Court concluded that the balancing of the individual and gov-
ernmental interests was not subject to a “mechanical” application, but
rather must take into account all of the relevant facts and circumstances and
be viewed “from the perspective of a “reasonable officer.”46 In articulating
what have become known as the Graham factors, the Court created a non-
exclusive list of considerations: “the severity of the crime at issue, whether
the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,
and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight.”47
Terry, Garner, Graham, and other Supreme Court decisions regarding
the Fourth Amendment in the 1960s, ‘70s, and ‘80s placed substantial
weight on balancing police powers against the intrusion on the individual’s
Fourth Amendment interests.48 The standards in these cases require a set of
value-laden judgments that do not lend themselves to rigid application. In
the cases decided before the radical transformation of the criminal justice
system that resulted in mass incarceration and the criminalization of com-
munities of color,49 the Court emphasized the interests of those being ap-
prehended when balancing the individual rights protected by the Fourth
Amendment against the governmental interest in apprehending a suspect.
In the cases decided in more recent terms of the Court, very little consid-
eration is given to the interests of the individual.  As a result, there have
been no significant cases in the last decade in which the Supreme Court
has held that the individual’s rights trumped the governmental interest. It
is difficult to square the Supreme Court’s finding in Garner that the shoot-
ing in the back of a seventeen-year-old suspect was unjustified, with its
ready acceptance of the shooting of fleeing suspects in the cases discussed
below. Given this shift, it is unclear whether the current Court would
maintain that shooting an unarmed, fleeing suspect is unjustified.50
45. Id. at 395 (emphasis in original).
46. Id. at 398.
47. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 398 (1989).
48. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-19 (1977); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981);
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
49. In the New Jim Crow, Michelle Alexander demonstrates the use of the criminal justice
system and the effects of collateral consequences of criminal justice involvement on maintaining
racial segregation and suppressing African-American economic mobility. MICHELLE ALEXAN-
DER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
50. In Brosseau v. Haugen, the Supreme Court found that shooting an unarmed person
who is fleeing the execution of arrest warrant for theft by attempting to start a car and drive away
does not create liability. 125 S. Ct. 596 (2004).
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B. The Court’s More Recent Narrow Application of the Fourth Amendment
in the Context of the Use of Force by Law Enforcement Makes
Private Civil Enforcement Very Difficult
When the Kerner Commission issued its report in 1968, there were
fewer than 190,000 prisoners in the United States, the majority of whom
were White.51 The rate of incarceration was the lowest it had been since
the 1920s at ninety-four persons incarcerated per 100,000 in the popula-
tion.52 The “War on Drugs”53 soon changed the face of prisons. Today,
2.3 million people are in prison or in jail and nearly seven million are
under some form of correctional supervision.54 For every 100,000 people,
more than 400 are incarcerated.55 The United States has 4.4 percent of the
world’s population and twenty-two percent of its prisoners.56 African-
American men are six times more likely to be incarcerated than White
men.57 Nearly one out of every five African-American men is missing
from his family and from his community because he is incarcerated.58 The
criminal justice system, with police at the forefront, has become the domi-
nant governmental institution in many communities.
51. MARC MAUER, THE RACE TO INCARCERATE (1999).
52. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON POPULATION 1925
– 81, (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p2581.pdf.
53. In 1971, President Richard Nixon declared a war on drugs and led a fight for in-
creased enforcement of drug laws and enhanced penalties for drug crimes. Frontline, Thirty Years
of America’s Drug War, PUBLIC BROADCASTING SERVICE, http://.pbs.org///////. While drug
use and drug-related crime stayed relatively constant over time, arrests and incarcerations for
drugs increased dramatically as a result of the War on Drugs policies. Tina Dorsey, Drugs and
Crime Facts, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (2012), http://www.bjs
.gov/content/pub/pdf/dcf.pdf.
54. Nick Wing, America’s Horrifying Mass-Incarceration System, In 1 Chart, HUFFINGTON
POST (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/us-prison-population_us_56686c
f0e4b0f290e5217ffb.
55. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2013 (Sept.
2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf.
56. The United States population is 322 million, which is 4.4 percent of the world popu-
lation of 7.29 billion. U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS (Dec. 30, 2015), http://
www.census.gov/popclock/. There were 2.217 million prisoners in the United States, which is
about twenty-two percent of the global prison population of 10.2 million. Highest to Lowest –
Prison Population Total, INST. FOR CRIM. POL’Y RES. (DEC. 30, 2015), http://www.prison-
studies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison-population-to-
tal?field_region_taxonomy_tid=All&=Apply; see also OECD Factbook 2010, ORG. FOR ECON.
COOPERATION AND DEV. (May 25, 2010), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-
factbook-2010_factbook-2010-en.
57. Prison Population Reductions Stalled in 2013, SENTENCING PROJECT (Sept. 16, 2014),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/detail/news.cfm?news_id=1872&id=167.
58. Justin Wolfers, David Leonhardy & Kevin Quealy, 1.5 Million Missing Black Men,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/04/20/upshot/miss-
ing-black-men.html?abt%3D0002%26abg%3D1&_r=0.
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Alongside the dramatic expansion of the prison system, the Supreme
Court’s application of the balancing test articulated in its Fourth Amend-
ment cases tilted toward the justification of officer conduct. The Court
heightened the wall to judicial review by relying on qualified immunity—a
doctrine that holds that a public official “cannot be said to have violated a
clearly established right unless the right’s contours were sufficiently defi-
nite that any reasonable official in his shoes would have understood that he
was violating it.”59
The holdings in Graham and Garner that require a detailed analysis of
the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether the force
used was reasonable did not clearly establish the law sufficient for officer
misconduct to be judged unconstitutional. The current Court has set a
nearly impossible bar, demanding that the “statutory or constitutional
question be beyond debate . . . with a robust consensus of cases of persua-
sive authority.”60 The Court found that “use of Garner’s ‘general’ test for
excessive force” is insufficient.61 The Court has expressly designed quali-
fied immunity “to protect officers from the sometimes ‘hazy border be-
tween excessive and acceptable force,’ ”62 even where the officer’s conduct
is “constitutionally deficient.”63 To avoid the application of qualified im-
munity, the plaintiff must show that “it was clearly established that the
Fourth Amendment prohibited the officer’s conduct in the ‘situation
[she] confronted.’ ”64 Given that no two circumstances are exactly alike,
meeting this threshold is often daunting.
Among the most stunning decisions on the use of force by police is
the Court’s 2015 opinion in San Francisco v. Sheehan.65 Sheehan had
schizoaffective disorder and was living in a group home for persons with
mental illness.66 She had a private room on the second floor, and the facil-
59. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014).
60. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083-84 (2011).
61. Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2020; see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (hold-
ing that the right must be clearly established in a “particularized” manner).
62. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206.
63. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004).
64. The full text without ellipses makes clear the level of identity between the challenged
conduct and prior precedent that is required to overcome a qualified immunity challenge: “Use
of Garner’s ‘general’ test for excessive force was ‘mistaken.’ The correct inquiry, the Court ex-
plained, was whether it was clearly established that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the of-
ficer’s conduct in the ‘‘situation [she] confronted’: whether to shoot a disturbed felon, set on
avoiding capture through vehicular flight, when persons in the immediate area are at risk from
that flight.’ The Court considered three court of appeals cases discussed by the parties, noted that
‘this area is one in which the result depends very much on the facts of each case,’ and concluded
that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because ‘[n]one of [the cases] squarely governs
the case here.’”  Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 309 (2015) (internal citations omitted).
65. 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015).
66. Id. at 1769.
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ity had a social worker on its staff.67 Sheehan stopped eating, taking medi-
cation, and speaking with her psychiatrist.68 When the social worker
checked on her, she told him that she had a knife, that she did not want his
help, and that she would kill him if he returned.69 The social worker then
cleared the building and called the police to take her into custody on a
temporary commitment.70
Two officers responded to the call and knocked on Sheehan’s door.71
When she did not answer, they entered her room.72 Sheehan grabbed a
knife and threated to kill them.73 They retreated behind the door momen-
tarily.74 The officers then reentered the room without announcing them-
selves.75 Ms. Sheehan came forward with the knife, and they sprayed her
with pepper spray.76 When she did not stop, they shot her repeatedly.77
Two of the three Graham factors—”the severity of the crime at issue”
and “whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others”—weighed heavily in favor of Sheehan but were largely
ignored the Court. She had not committed a crime; the police were called
to protect her welfare.78 Moreover, the officers found safety behind the
door and were in no danger until they reentered the room knowing that
using force would be unavoidable. The only factor that the Court mean-
ingfully took into account was her resistance to being taken into custody.
The Court’s heavy reliance on Sheehan’s resistance, to the exclusion of all
other factors, distorted the multi-factor inquiry required by Graham.
The Court had no trouble finding that the use of force during the
second entry was constitutional.79  Unlike the cases discussed above, the
Court in Sheehan never considered the magnitude of the liberty interest of
a severely mentally ill woman who was alone in a second-floor room.80
Not even the testimony that the officer’s conduct violated the San Fran-
67. Id. at 1770.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1769-71.
71. Id. at 1771.
72. Id.
73. Id.




78. The City of San Francisco attempted to prosecute Sheehan for assault with a deadly
weapon, assault on a police officer with a deadly weapon, and criminal threats. The jury acquit-
ted on the threats and hung on the other charges. Id. at 1771.
79. For reasons that are not clear from the opinion in the case, the warrantless first entry
was never challenged. Id. at 1776.
80. Id.
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cisco Police Department’s policy and training persuaded the Court.81 The
Department’s policy was not to enter a barricaded room but instead to
wait for back up and a trained negotiator.82 The Court nominally decided
the case on the grounds of qualified immunity, finding that a “reasonable
officer” might not know that it was unlawful to engage in the conduct that
led to shooting Sheehan.83 This was a marked departure from the language
in Terry that “simple ‘good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not
enough . . . . If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of
the Fourth Amendment would evaporate.”84
The driving principle in the Sheehan decision originated from a sin-
gle line in Graham: “The calculus of reasonableness must embody allow-
ance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolv-
ing—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situa-
tion.”85 In an effort to avoid the balancing of interests required by the
Fourth Amendment, the Court resolved the case on qualified immunity
grounds.86 Thus, the overwhelming concern of the Sheehan Court was
considering whether the officers could have had a subjective belief that
their conduct was lawful.87 But in Graham, any deference to the officer’s
decision-making was placed in the context of “careful attention to the facts
and circumstances of each particular case.”88 Graham also warns that the
standard must be objective and that “[a]n officer’s evil intentions will not
make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use
of force; nor will an officer’s good intentions make an objectively unrea-
sonable use of force constitutional.”89 Cloaking the analysis in qualified
immunity may give the Sheehan Court doctrinal cover, but it still has a
corrosive impact on the ability of individuals and communities to hold
police accountable by creating a very high bar to secure relief from the
courts.
Similar interpretations of Graham and Garner were applied in Plumhoff
v. Rickard, a recent case challenging the use of deadly force to stop a driver
who is evading arrest.90 Rickard was pulled over for a broken headlight
and windshield.91 When asked for his license, he sped away and led the
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1777.
83. Id.
84. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
85. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989).
86. San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1778 (2015).
87. Id.
88. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
89. Id. at 397.
90. 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014).
91. Id. at 2017.
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police on a high-speed chase involving multiple officers on a crowded
highway where Rickard and officers weaved in and out of traffic.92 The
chase ended in a parking lot.93 When Rickard again attempted to drive
away from the police, the officers fired twelve shots, killing him and his
passenger.94
The Court found this use of force objectively reasonable, relying on
its previous decision in Scott v. Harris,95 in which it found that an officer’s
ramming of a suspect’s car objectively reasonable because the driver posed
a threat to pedestrians.96 In Plumhoff, the Court failed to consider that
Rickard was being apprehended for an equipment violation and disre-
garded that Rickard was driving away from officers at the time they shot at
him and that there were no civilians around.97 Instead, the Court relied
heavily on his attempt to escape and involvement in a high-speed chase.98
The emphasis on Rickard’s flight dominates the opinion. In one pas-
sage, the Court noted:
Under the circumstances at the moment when the shots were
fired, all that a reasonable police officer could have concluded
was that Rickard was intent on resuming his flight and that, if
he was allowed to do so, he would once again pose a deadly
threat for others on the road. Rickard’s conduct even after the
shots were fired—as noted, he managed to drive away despite
the efforts of the police to block his path—underscores the
point.99
The centrality of flight to the finding of reasonableness in Plumhoff
stands in sharp contrast to the language in the Garner opinion:
The use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony sus-
pects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreason-
able. It is not better that all felony suspects die than that they
escape. Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the
officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing
to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do
so. It is no doubt unfortunate when a suspect who is in sight
escapes, but the fact that the police arrive a little late or are a
little slower afoot does not always justify killing the suspect.100
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2018.
95. Id. at 2022; Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
96. Scott, 550 U.S. at 386.
97. Id. at 372.
98. Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2021-22.
99. Id. at 2022.
100. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
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While the Plumhoff Court emphasized the dangerousness of a high-
speed chase,101 it ignored the fact that the chase would cease as soon as the
police stopped chasing the suspect. For this reason, many police depart-
ments have implemented a policy limiting high-speed chases and the cir-
cumstances in which an officer can shoot at a moving car.102 High-speed
pursuits are extremely dangerous, killing and injuring hundreds of bystand-
ers and passengers each year.103 Ninety-one percent of chases are for non-
violent offenses and forty-two percent are for traffic violations.104 The
danger, especially for pursuits based on minor offenses, has led the Depart-
ment of Justice to recommend restrictive chased policies.105  For example,
the National Institute of Justice issued recommendations in 1990 to limit
the use of high-speed chases and to pursue alternatives, including ceasing
the pursuit and tracking down the car at a later time through its license
plate number.106
The Court’s excessive deference to the judgments of police officers is
demonstrated in other Fourth Amendment contexts as well. In Whren v.
United States,107 the Supreme Court authorized police to use any traffic
law violation as justification for a pretext stop.108 The use of “pretext”
stops has been widely credited as the cause for racial disparities in stops and
101. Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2022.
102. The Court extended the rule the next term in Mullenix v. Luna to permit shooting at
moving vehicles even when there is no immediate threat, making the use of deadly force in many
automobile chases very hard to challenge. See, e.g., MPD Change Pursuit Policy: Alderman Dono-
van to Hold News Conference, CITY OF MILWAUKEE (Mar. 29, 2010), http://city.milwaukee.gov/
ImageLibrary/Groups/ccCouncil/2010PDF/08MPD_pursuit_newseradvis.pdf; Lexi Belculfine,
Pittsburgh police chief ‘locks down’ rules for vehicle pursuits, PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE (Nov. 25,
2015), http://www.post-gazette.com/local/city/2015/11/25/Pittsburgh-police-chief-aimed-
to-tighten-pursuit-policy-with-order-following-Bloomfield-crash/stories/201511250302.
103. More than 5,000 bystanders have been killed in police chases since 1979 and tens of
thousands more have been injured. Thomas Frank, High-speed police chases have killed thousands of
innocent bystanders: Victims include small children, teenage drivers and the elderly, USA TODAY (July 30,
2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/07/30/police-pursuits-fatal-injuries/30187
827/.
104. The Case for Banning High-Speed Police Chases, PRICENOMICS, http://priceonomics
.com/the-case-for-banning-high-speed-police-chases (last visited July 22, 2015).
105. Hugh Nugent et al., Restrictive Policies for High-Speed Police Pursuits, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE 20 (May 16, 1990), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitiza-
tion/122025NCJRS.pdf; see also Laura J. Nichols, Managing Police Pursuit Policy, INT’L ASS’N OF
CHIEFS OF POLICE (2004), http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/ManagingPolicePursuitsEx
ecBrief.pdf.
106. Nugent et al., supra note 105, at 20.
107. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
108. Id. at 816.
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for the phenomenon of driving while Black or Brown.109 Racial bias in
stops has been corrosive to the legitimacy of law enforcement.110
Even where a litigant can clear the high hurdle of qualified immunity
and the Court could otherwise recognize a constitutional violation, stand-
ing rules can make it difficult for an individual to bring a challenge in
court. In Los Angeles v. Lyons,111 an African-American man who was
placed in a chokehold during a traffic stop sought to challenge the City’s
chokehold policy.112 Since he could not show that the policy would ever
be used against him again, the Court found that he could not seek an
injunction to stop the practice, regardless of whether it was
unconstitutional.113
C. The Paucity of Criminal Prosecutions has not led to Accountability
Along with other accountability measures, one of the central de-
mands of the Black Lives Matters movement and those protesting police
violence is for increased prosecution of abusive officers.114 Despite the rise
in prosecutions of police last year,115 only a small fraction of the thousands
of uses of deadly force, even force against unarmed individuals, are ever
charged. In 2015, seventeen police officers were charged nationally in fatal
shootings, up from an average of five.116 Of those charged, twelve of the
cases were caught on video.117 By some reports, nearly 1,100 people have
109. See e.g., David A. Harris, Driving While Black: Racial Profiling On Our Nation’s High-
ways, ACLU (June 1999), https://www.aclu.org/report/driving-while-black-racial-profiling-
our-nations-highways; Justice on Trial, Willful Judicial Blindness, Justice on Trial—Chapter IV: Willful
Judicial Blindness, The LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, http://www.civilrights.org/publications/jus-
tice-on-trial/judicial.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2015); see generally Christopher Kutz, For a Safer
America, Curtail Traffic Stops, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/
opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0813-kutz-traffic-stops-20150812-story.html.
110. Cf. Jody Feder, Racial Profiling: Legal and Constitutional Issues, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV. 4-5 (Apr. 16, 2012), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31130.pdf (setting forth the
doctrinal and procedural barriers to proving discrimination in police stops created by Whren).
111. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
112. Id. at 98.
113. Id. at 105.
114. Independent Investigations and Prosecutions, CAMPAIGN ZERO, http://www.join-
campaignzero.org/investigations (last visited Dec. 28, 2015).
115. Conor Friedersdorf, The Number of Cops Indicted for Murder Spikes Upwards, THE AT-
LANTIC (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/08/the-shocking-
number-of-cops-recently-indicted-for-murder/401732/.
116. More US Police Charged With Murder or Manslaughter, CBS NEWS (Dec. 3, 2015, 5:32
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/more-u-s-police-charged-with-murder-or-manslaugh-
ter-in-2015/.
117. Brandon Patterson, Here Are All of the Cops Who Were Charged in 2015 for Shooting
Suspects, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 17, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/
2015/12/year-police-shootings.
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died at the hands of police.118 More than 200 of the people who died were
unarmed during the encounter.119
The death of Eric Garner from an officer’s chokehold did not result
in an indictment, despite being captured on video.120 Garner was being
arrested for violating a New York law that prohibited the sale of loose
cigarettes.121 The grand jury that heard this case did not find probable
cause to charge the officer with a crime.122 While the grand jury proceed-
ings have remained secret and the prosecutor has provided very little in-
sight on the deliberations,123 it is difficult to imagine a grand jury that
genuinely balanced Garner’s individual interests against the government’s
desire to arrest him. If the police officer in Tennessee v. Garner ‘may not
seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead,’ where the
officer was investigating a suspected burglary,124 it is hard to imagine that
the State’s interest in the sale of untaxed cigarettes was so strong that it
justified choking Eric Garner to death.
The shooting of Tamir Rice in Cleveland just days before
Thanksgiving in 2014, and for which the grand jury has declined to bring
an indictment, also illustrates the barriers to prosecution.125 Rice was play-
118. The Guardian maintains a database of media reports of deaths of civilians during en-
counters with police. The Counted: People killed by police in the US, THE GUARDIAN, http://www
.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/the-counted-police-killings-us-
database# (last visited Dec. 15, 2015); see also, KILLED BY POLICE, http://killedbypolice.net//
(last visited Jan. 30, 2016), and FATAL ENCOUNTERS, http://www.fatalencounters.org/ (last vis-
ited Jan. 30, 2016), for similar data sets.
119. The Counted, People Killed by Police in the US, THE GUARDIAN http://www.theguar-
dian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/the-counted-police-killings-us-database (last
visited Feb. 9, 2016).
120. Andrew Siff, Jonathan Dienst & Jennifer Millman, Grand Jury Declines to Indict NYPD
Officer in Eric Garner Chokehold Death, NBC NEWS (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.nbcnewyork
.com/news/local/Grand-Jury-Decision-Eric-Garner-Staten-Island-Chokehold-Death-NYPD-
284595921.html. The case is still under review by the Criminal Section of the Civil Rights
Division of the United States Department of Justice at the time of this writing.
121. See Al Baker, J. David Goodman & Benjamin Mueller, Beyond the Chokehold: the Path
to Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/
nyregion/eric-garner-police-chokehold-staten-island.html?_r=0.
122. Statement by Richmond County District Attorney Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., Regarding
the No True Bill in The Matter of the Investigation into the Death of Eric Garner 1 (Dec. 15, 2015),
http://www.capitalnewyork.com/sites/default/files/Statement%20by%20Richmond%20Coun
ty%20District%20Attorney.pdf [hereinafter Donovan Statement]; Eyder Peralta, Grand Jury In
Garner Case Heard From 50 Witnesses, Saw 4 Videos, NPR (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.npr.org/
sections/thetwo-way/2014/12/04/368519032/grand-jury-in-garner-case-heard-from-50-wit
nesses-saw-4-videos.
123. Donovan Statement, supra note 122; Peralta, supra note 122.
124. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
125. Statement from County Prosecutor Timothy J. McGinty on the decision of the Grand
Jury in the Tamir Rice case (Dec. 28, 2015), http://prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us/en-us/Inves-
tigation-Into-Death-of-Tamir-Rice.aspx.
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ing with a toy gun in a public park.126 After a 911 call, a police car was
dispatched to the scene.127 Rice was alone when the police arrived.128
The car pulled up less than ten feet from Rice, and within seconds the
officer had fatally shot him.129 Two experts hired by the Cuyahoga County
Attorney concluded, applying Garner as understood through Sheehan, that
the officers’ conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment.130 One of
the experts dismissed as a mere “tactic” the decision to drive within feet of
Rice.131 “Tactics,” the expert concluded, were beyond Fourth Amend-
ment scrutiny, relying on the decision in Sheehan.132
As the primary responsibility for prosecuting police misconduct falls
on local prosecutors, it is no surprise that so few cases are brought. Local
prosecutors are frequently elected, depend on the police for their work,
and have deep ties to law enforcement. These are strong incentives to avoid
strict accountability. Calls for independent prosecutors, grand jury reform,
and other accountability measures133 may help overcome the inherent
problem of asking a prosecutor to pursue police misconduct while simulta-
neously relying on the police to make her or his cases.
Moreover, the federal role in prosecuting police officers for miscon-
duct is limited. Federal prosecutors must rely on the portion of the Civil
Rights Act that prohibits deprivation of rights under color of law.134 To
prosecute under this statute, the United States must show that the defen-
dant officer was acting under color of law, that she or he deprived a victim
of a right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, that
she or he acted willfully, and that the deprivation resulted in bodily injury
and/or death.135 Willfulness is amongst the highest-level mens rea require-
126. CUYAHOGA CNTY. PROSECUTOR, REPORT ON THE NOV. 22, 2014 SHOOTING OF
TAMIR RICE 2, http://prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us/pdf_prosecutor/en-US/Rice%20Case%
20Report%20FINAL%20FINAL%2012-28a.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2015).
127. Id. at 2-4.
128. Id. at 24.
129. Id. at 4.
130. S. LAMAR SIMS, REPORT (RE: THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE OFFICER-INVOLVED
SHOOTING OF TAMIR RICE) 13-14 (Oct. 6, 2015), http://prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us/
pdf_prosecutor/en-US/Tamir%20Rice%20Investigation/Sims-Review%20of%20Deadly%20
Force-Tamir%20Rice.pdf [hereinafter SIMS REPORT].
131. W. KEN KATSARIS, REPORT AND OPINIONS OF W. KEN KATSARIS 8 (Nov. 12,
2015), http://prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us/pdf_prosecutor/en-US/Tamir%20Rice%20Investi
gation/Katsaris%20Report%20on%20Tamir%20Rice_Redacted.pdf.
132. SIMS REPORT, supra note 130, at 13-14.
133. See, e.g., Policy Solutions and Initiative for Independent Investigations and Prosecutions, CAM-
PAIGN ZERO, http://www.joincampaignzero.org/investigations (last visited Jan. 28, 2016).
134. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012).
135. Id. (“Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution
or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such
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ments in the criminal law and requires a showing that the conduct was “in
open defiance or in reckless disregard of a constitutional requirement
which has been made specific or definite.”136 Despite this very high bur-
den, the Civil Rights Division prosecuted 254 law enforcement officers for
color of law violations in the four-year period from 2009 to 2012.137
II. THE DEMOCRATIZING OF POLICING CAN HELP OVERCOME THE
BARRIERS ERECTED TO CIVIL LITIGATION OR CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION AND CREATE A CULTURE OF
POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY
Since the Europeans enslaved the first Native American in 1492, offi-
cial force has been used to subjugate people of color.138 The slavery of
Africans was enforced by State power even in the face of a movement for
abolition; police were used to ensure that slave owners sustained their do-
minion over the people they claimed as property.139 The naked use of
police to enforce White supremacy extended through the period of Jim
Crow and was apparent to the Kerner Commission in 1968, when it con-
cluded that police “symbolize white power, white racism and white re-
pression” to many in the Black community.140
With the advent of the civil rights movement, the enactment of the
Civil Rights Act141 and other anti-discrimination laws, de jure discrimina-
tion by police was outlawed. But Whren’s permission to use pretext to
obscure “driving while Black/Brown/Native American,” the dispropor-
tionate criminalization of communities of color during the War on Drugs,
and the opacity of the police department operations have enabled the op-
pression of communities of color to continue. Outward uses of shocking
force, like Bull Connor’s dogs and fire hoses, have been replaced by stop
and frisk, warrant squads, jump out teams, and SWAT. The application of
person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment
of citizens, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if
bodily injury results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from
the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to
kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt
to kill, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or
may be sentenced to death.”).
136. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-07 (1945).
137. U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division Accomplishments, 2009 – 2012, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/us-department-justice-civil-rights-division-ac
complishments-2009-2012#_Protecting_Individuals_within (Nov. 20, 2015).
138. See HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF AMERICA (1980).
139. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 414, 418 (1856).
140. KERNER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 28, at 301.
141. The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
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these measures are perceived by many to be applied in a discriminatory
fashion.142
Every year, more than one in four people in the United States en-
counter a police officer.143 But African Americans are significantly more
likely to interact with police than Whites, and African Americans are sig-
nificantly more likely to view their encounters as unjustified.144 Much of
White America is screened from the experience of African Americans and
other people of color in police encounters. Implicit, and in some cases
explicit, biases allow the majority electorate and those in political power to
avoid the reality of the African-American community.
Every few years, a high profile case brings the problem of excessive
force and racial bias to the forefront of the Nation’s consciousness. There is
a flurry of reform initiative but far too quickly the country returns to busi-
ness as usual. In 1984, Eleanor Bumpurs was killed by the New York City
police while they were evicting her for being behind in rent.145 While an
officer was charged in Bumpurs’s death, he was acquitted.146 Reforms of
police practices were implemented in the wake of this shooting.147 In
1992, the acquittal of the officers who beat Rodney King set off a rebel-
lion in Los Angeles.148 In 1994, Ernest Stayon was suffocated and died
while Staten Island police handcuffed him, and a grand jury refused to
indict.149 Abner Louima, a Haitian immigrant, was beaten and sexually
tortured by New York City police in 1997,150 setting off marches and
142. Study Finds Some Racial Differences In Perceptions Of Police Behavior During Contact With








147. Selwyn Raab, Ward Shifts Procedure In Disarming Deranged, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2,
1984), http://www.nytimes.com/1984/11/02/nyregion/ward-shifts-procedure-in-disarming-
deranged.html.
148. The L.A. Riots: 20 Years Later, 1992 Riots Timeline, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2012), http:/
/timelines.latimes.com/los-angeles-riots/.









ment=8&pgtype=collection. Original documents regarding the Louima case can be found at
http://www.thesmokinggun.com/documents/crime/abner-louima-torture-case-0.
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demonstrations.151 In 1999, four officers shot unarmed Amadou Diallo
with forty-one bullets in New York.152 Their jury acquittal led to a protest
movement.153
The availability of video evidence of police abuse has been a game-
changer and may make modern-day cases different. It is now beyond con-
tention that these are not isolated incidents but institutional failures and
that racial bias is built into the system. Cell phone, body-worn, and dash-
cam videos have made it impossible to deny Black voices and Black testi-
mony regarding abuse during police encounters. Videos have also allowed
for media coverage, the importance of which cannot be overstated. This
coverage has validated the daily experiences of people in communities of
color that have largely been ignored. Since the death of Michael Brown in
August 2014, there has been a relentless stream of videos of police shooting
unarmed persons, using excessive force, or otherwise engaging in miscon-
duct. This epidemic of misconduct did not just emerge—it has been there
all along.
The television reports and newspaper photographs of police suppres-
sion of the 1950s and ‘60s civil rights movement and of the enforcement of
Jim Crow laws had an enormous impact on the success of the passage of
the Civil Rights Acts.154 The videos we see today will also be important
when we look back at this time from the vantage point of history.
At the same time that the videos expose a problem with policing,
they reveal a deeper issue about why the reports and the testimony of peo-
ple of color have not been believed by the media, political leaders, or the
courts. In answering this question, we will find a solution that creates ac-
countability in policing and that will genuinely address the rift in trust
between police and the communities they are sworn to protect and serve.
The project of “fixing” policing is complex. It will take time and
effort and will require changes in culture, policy, training, hiring practices,
supervision, accountability systems, and tactics. In response to the demon-
strations and rebellion across the nation since Michael Brown’s death, Pres-
ident Obama appointed a Task Force on 21st Century Policing in
151. Demonstrators in New York protest police brutality, CNN (Aug. 29, 1997), http://web
.archive.org/web/20070105150456/http://www.cnn.com:80/US/9708/29/police.torture.ral
ly/.
152. Notable Cases Involving Police Brutality Complaints, supra note 149.
153. William K. Rashbaum, The Diallo Case: The Protests; Marchers Protest Diallo Verdict,
Taunting Police Along The Way, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/
02/27/nyregion/diallo-case-protests-marchers-protest-diallo-verdict-taunting-police-along-way
.html?pagewanted=all.
154. ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW, THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT (1991). President John Kennedy repeatedly mentioned the protests in Birmingham, Ala-
bama, and elsewhere in the speech he gave in June 1963, calling on Congress to enact civil rights
legislation. Radio and Television Report to the American People on Civil Rights, http://www.presi-
dency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9271 (last visited Jan. 1, 2016).
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December 2014.155 The Task Force issued a report containing hundreds of
recommendations in six separate domains: Building Trust and Legitimacy;
Policy and Oversight; Technology and Social Media; Community Policing
and Crime Reduction; Training and Education; and Officer Wellness and
Safety.156 The complexity of the undertaking is further demonstrated by
the detailed injunctions and the years of litigation and implementation of
reform orders where private or Civil Rights Division litigation has been
brought to secure reform.
No single component of reform will be successful alone. The project
requires deep and sustained changes inside departments, monitoring, and
oversight. This Article, however, focuses on one critical component of the
solution: the need to democratize the institution of policing through
meaningful community participation in the governance of police depart-
ments and in the transparency of police practices. This will require the
transfer of power and authority from current structures to new entities that
more fairly represent the range of people who make up a given commu-
nity and includes those most likely to be policed, including communities
of color, communities living in poverty, LGBT persons, and youth. It will
also require making data on police practices widely available, so the public
and decision-makers will know in real time whether policing reflects the
values of fairness and dignity and promotes public safety. As Justice Louis
Brandies famously wrote: “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants;
electric light the most efficient policeman.”157
Civilian participation in governance and increased transparency, as a
part of a broader set of strategies that includes civil litigation and criminal
prosecution, legislative reforms, and other measures, offers a path out of
the narrow construction of the Constitution demonstrated by the Supreme
Court decisions discussed above. The role of litigation remains important,
as is demonstrated by the federal injunctions designed to end to racial pro-
filing in Maricopa County, Arizona;158 stop-and-frisk in New York;159
and discriminatory practices in other communities. But in each of those
communities, trust in police remains low and abuses continue. Without
litigation, the reform process would not begin in many places; but without
creating greater democracy in policing, the process will never be complete.
They are indispensably tied together.
155. Exec. Order No. 13684, 79 C.F.R. 76865 (Dec. 14, 2014); The Executive Order—
Establishment of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, THE WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 18,
2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/18/executive-order-establish-
ment-presidents-task-force-21st-century-policin.
156. FINAL REPORT OF PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, supra
note 9.
157. LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY—AND HOW BANKERS USE IT (2014).
158. Melendres v. Arpiao, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2015).
159. Floyd v. City of New York, 770 F.3d 1051 (2d Cir. 2014).
SPRING 2016] Police Use of Force Jurisprudence 337
There are important lessons to be learned from the work of the Civil
Rights Division of the United States Department of Justice in creating
transparency and oversight as part of litigated reform.160 Before discussing
the essential role of the Civil Rights Division in ensuring police accounta-
bility, it is important to disclose that I served in the Division from 2010 to
2015 as the Chief of the Special Litigation Section. The Special Litigation
Section was charged with enforcing provisions of the Violent Crime and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994,161 which authorized the Attorney General
of the United States to bring litigation to address patterns or practices of a
law enforcement agency that violate the Constitution or federal law. The
United States has standing under 42 U.S.C § 14141 to seek prospective
injunctive relief and thus avoids some of the barriers that private litigants
face in overcoming Lyons and qualified immunity. I had the honor to work
with an extraordinary team of lawyers, investigators, paralegals, and other
staff on more than two dozen police accountability matters, including in-
vestigations, litigation, and consent decree enforcement.162
Civil Rights Division investigations are an effective tool— arguably
the most effective tool—to address widespread constitutional violations in-
side a police department. In one of the few comprehensive studies of a
consent decree, a researcher looking at the Los Angeles Police Department
found that not only had the pattern or practice of illegal conduct been
addressed but that the police department was “noticeably different from
what it was only a few years ago. The quality of service to residents is
160. It is important to note that the federal government is not a monolith on these issues.
Federal law enforcement agencies engage in some of the same practices and suffer from some of
the same deficiencies as the local police departments that are subject to review by the Civil
Rights Division. Ryan J. Reilly, Feds Urge Crackdown On Bad Cops, But Agencies Haven’t Gotten
The Message: Internal affairs departments at federal agencies have the same transparency problems as the
local authorities the DOJ has investigated, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.huf-
fingtonpost.com/entry/doj-transparency-problems_567060fee4b0e292150f72b8. Moreover, the
guidance issued by the Attorney General on the use of race by federal law enforcement agents
allows federal officials to target specific ethnic and religious groups in certain circumstances, such
as by mapping population concentrations of specified ethnic groups. Guidance For Federal Law
Enforcement Agencies Regarding The Use Of Race, Ethnicity, Gender, National Origin, Religion, Sexual
Orientation, Or Gender Identity, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 2014), http://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/ag/pages/attachments/2014/12/08/use-of-race-policy.pdf.
161. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14141; Special Litiga-
tion Section, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/special-litigation-section (last
visited Feb. 9, 2016).
162. The Civil Rights Division posts all significant documents concerning its police ac-
countability work on the Section’s webpage. Special Litigation Section Cases and Matters, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.justice.gov/crt/special-litigation-section-cases-
and-matters0.
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higher, the perception of the LAPD as fair has risen, and the use of force is
down.”163
During the course of an investigation, the Section’s experienced staff
and a team of consultants undertake a comprehensive review of a depart-
ment’s practices, identify not only the pattern of violation but the systemic
cause, and work with the department to develop a remedy. Investigations
are time-consuming and intensive. Even with the resources of the United
States, the Section is unable to investigate or litigate in every community
where there is a serious problem. There are approximately 18,000 police
departments across the Nation,164 and many have a problem with excessive
use of force. In a national survey of 925 officers, researchers found:
Almost 22 percent agreed or strongly agreed that officers in
their departments sometimes (or often or always) use more
force than necessary, and only 16 percent reported that their
fellow officers never do so. Although more than 90 percent
found it inappropriate for officers to respond to verbal abuse
with physical force, almost 15 percent indicated that officers in
their departments engaged in such behavior at least
sometimes.165
Civil Rights investigations of law enforcement agencies play multiple
roles:
• In communities where there is a pattern of unconstitutional con-
duct by police, an investigation and a consent decree, or in appro-
priate circumstances, an out-of-court settlement, can fix the
problem. While agreements under prior administrations may have
been less than robust,166 the Obama Justice Department has priori-
tized comprehensive court-enforceable agreements and has in-
vested significant staff time in ensuring that these agreements are
enforced.
163. Christopher Stone, Thomas Fogelstone & Christine Cole, Policing Los Angeles Under a
Consent Decree: The Dynamics Of Change At the LAPD, HARVARD KENNEDY SCH. OF GOV’T 1
(May 2009), http://assets.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/Harvard-LAPD%20Study.pdf.
164. BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008 at 2 (July 2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
csllea08.pdf.
165. David Weisburd et al., Police Attitudes Toward Abuse of Authority: Findings From a Na-
tional Study, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE 3 (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/181312.pdf; see also Robert E. Worden, The Causes of Police Brutality: Theory and
Evidence on Police Use of Force, in POLICE VIOLENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING
Police Abuse of Force 23 (Yale Univ. Press 1996) (finding thirty-nine percent of police uses of
force to be excessive).
166. See, e.g., Samuel Walker & Morgan Macdonald, An Alternative Remedy for Police Mis-
conduct: A Model State “Pattern or Practice” Statute, 19 GEO. MASON C.R. L.J. 479, 502-05 (2009).
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• The findings and agreements reached by the Civil Rights Division
provide guidance to other police departments. While each com-
munity is unique and each city must find the solutions that pre-
cisely address its problems and build on its strengths, there are
lessons to be drawn from the outcomes in other cities facing similar
issues.
• Activists and political leaders working to create accountability in
other communities can also use the findings and agreements to
guide their efforts. The investigative findings and the reform agree-
ments can provide insights for their reform processes and ideas for
effective remedies.
During the Obama administration, significantly greater emphasis has
been placed on community engagement during an investigation, and
ongoing engagement has been built into the remedies for patterns of viola-
tions found during investigations. In nearly every city investigated, the pat-
tern of constitutional violations led to breakdowns in the relationships
between sectors of the community and the police. Repairing the trust be-
tween them is an essential element of sustainable reform. Unless the public
views the police as fair and the process as equitable, cooperation in the
creation of public safety will be limited and hostility will increase the like-
lihood of abuse.167 As one of the leading scholars in police legitimacy
noted, “Being viewed as fair and just is critical to successful policing in a
democracy. When the police are perceived as unfair in their law enforce-
ment practices, it will undermine their effectiveness.”168
167. See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002).
168. INST. ON RACE AND JUSTICE, NORTHEASTERN UNIV., OFFICE OF CMTY. ORI-
ENTED POLICING SERVICES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROMOTING COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES
TO REDUCE RACIAL PROFILING 20-21 (2008); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS
DIV. & U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, N. DIST. OF OHIO, INVESTIGATION OF THE CLEVELAND
DIVISION OF POLICE 49 (2014)(demonstrating in practical terms the effect of unrestrained mis-
conduct: “During our investigation, we found that CDP’s method of policing contributes to the
community’s distrust of and lack of respect for officers—officers escalate situations instead of
diffusing them and using them as an opportunity to build trust and rapport; officers draw their
service weapons on people who are suspected of minor crimes or who do not otherwise pose a
threat; and officers use force against people in mental health crisis after family members have
called the police in a desperate plea for assistance. Any attempt CDP makes to establish and
maintain a positive and beneficial relationship with the community is potentially also under-
mined by the frequency with which officers appear to stop and search people without meeting
the requisite threshold of reasonable suspicion or probable cause. As noted previously in the
Summary section of this letter, it appears preliminarily that officers often subject people to stops
and searches without the requisite level of suspicion. In addition, despite the fact that we are
making no finding regarding racial profiling, we must report that when we interviewed members
of the community about their experiences with the police, many African-Americans reported
that they believe CDP officers are verbally and physically aggressive toward them because of their
race. We also found that, when community members attempt to file complaints about is treat-
ment at the hands of CDP officers, they are met with barriers and resistance.”).
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The City of Ferguson, Missouri, is a particularly acute example of
the hostility that forms when police practices are abusive and unchecked,
although it is far from unique. The Ferguson investigation found that “the
disconnect and distrust between much of Ferguson’s African-American
community and FPD is caused largely by years of the unlawful and unfair
law enforcement practices by Ferguson’s police department and municipal
court.”169 Hundreds of conversations that the Civil Rights Division staff
had with Ferguson residents and those who lived nearby revealed that Afri-
can-American residents felt particularly ill-treated:
One white individual who has lived in Ferguson for 48 years
told us that it feels like Ferguson’s police and court system is
“designed to bring a black man down . . . [there are] no sec-
ond chances.” We heard from African-American residents who
told us of Ferguson’s “long history of targeting blacks for har-
assment and degrading treatment,” and who described the steps
they take to avoid this—from taking routes to work that skirt
Ferguson to moving out of state. An African-American minis-
ter of a church in a nearby community told us that he doesn’t
allow his two sons to drive through Ferguson out of “fear that
they will be targeted for arrest.”170
The remedies sought by the Department of Justice must be closely
tied to a pattern or practice of a violation of law. As demonstrated in Fer-
guson and elsewhere, the fundamental reasons that patterns of violations
developed and were permitted to continue were a lack of trust between
certain communities and the police and a lack of community oversight.
Therefore, remedies for sustainable reform must account for mistrust and
develop strategies to overcome it. The oversight provisions discussed below
illustrate the kinds of measures that can be narrowly tailored to meet the
unconstitutional practices found.
Transparency is critical to building trust. To model the behavior that
is expected of law enforcement agencies, all Civil Rights Division pattern-
and-practice police misconduct investigations have been announced pub-
licly since 2010, often with a press conference in the city being investi-
gated.171 Email addresses and phone hotlines were set up for each city to
begin collecting information directly from those who wanted to give in-
put.172 The investigative team met with the many communities that make
169. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON PO-
LICE DEPARTMENT 79 (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/
2015/03/04/ferguson_findings_3-4-15.pdf.
170. Id.
171. Press releases for investigations, findings, and settlements can be found at Special Litiga-
tion Section, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/special-litigation-section (last
visited Jan. 29, 2016).
172. Id.
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up each jurisdiction—those who experienced civil rights violations, faith
leaders, business leaders, police unions, rank and file officers, neighbor-
hood associations, and others.173
To provide the populace with an understanding of the conclusions
reached by the Department of Justice, letters with detailed findings were
issued and released to the public.174 Where there were large language mi-
173. Each investigative report contains an explanation of the methodology, including com-
munity outreach strategies. E.g., JOCELYN SAMUELS & DAMON P. MARTINEZ, REPORT OF THE
INVESTIGATION OF THE ALBUQUERQUE POLICE DEPARTMENT 7 (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www
.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/04/10/apd_findings_4-10-14.pdf (“We con-
ducted our evaluation of the department’s use of force in three major phases: fact-gathering,
incident analysis based on applicable legal standards, and a comprehensive review of policies and
practices to identify significant factors that cause or contribute to misconduct. Our review was
informed by many sources, including: (1) individuals participating in community town hall
meetings and separate witness interviews; (2) agency stakeholders, such as the department’s of-
ficers, supervisors, and command staff; (3) other stakeholders in the City, including the officers’
union representatives, police oversight commissioners and investigative staff, City officials, and
community group leaders; (4) department documents, including use-of-force and shooting files;
and (5) information and insights provided by our expert police consultants. . . . In this fact-
gathering phase, we also sought to learn more from those who had direct interactions with the
department. We held four community town hall meetings in different regions of the City and
conducted initial and follow-up interviews of hundreds of people. We also interviewed dozens of
people through additional community outreach efforts. We verified these accounts by reviewing
available documentary, photographic, and video support, as well as department records.”).
174. See generally THOMAS E. PEREZ, UNITED STATES’ INVESTIGATION OF THE MARI-
COPA COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/doc-
uments/mcso_findletter_12-15-11.pdf; THOMAS E. PEREZ, INVESTIGATION OF LOS ANGELES
COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT STATIONS IN ANTELOPE VALLEY (June 28, 2013), http://
www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/antelope_findings_6-28-13.pdf; THOMAS E. PE-
REZ, INVESTIGATION OF THE EAST HAVEN POLICE DEPARTMENT (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www
.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/easthaven_findletter_12-19-11.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF JUS-
TICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT (Mar.
16, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/nopd_report.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT (Mar. 4, 2015),
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/ferguson_findings_3-4-15.pdf; THOMAS E.
PEREZ & MICHAEL W. COTTER, THE UNITED STATES’ INVESTIGATION OF THE MISSOULA
POLICE DEPARTMENT (May 5, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/mis-
soulapdfind_5-15-13.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV. & U.S. ATTORNEY’S OF-
FICE, DIST. OF N.J., INVESTIGATION OF THE NEWARK POLICE DEPARTMENT (July 22, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/07/22/newark_findings_7-22-14
.pdf; JOCELYN SAMUELS & DAMON P. MARTINEZ, REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE
ALBUQUERQUE POLICE DEPARTMENT (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/
documents/apd_findings_4-10-14.pdf; VANITA GUPTA & STEVEN M. DETTELACH, INVESTIGA-
TION OF THE CLEVELAND DIVISION OF POLICE (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/crt/
about/spl/documents/cleveland_findings_12-4-14.pdf; THOMAS E. PEREZ & AMANDA MAR-
SHALL, INVESTIGATION OF THE PORTLAND POLICE BUREAU (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.jus-
tice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/ppb_findings_9-12-12.pdf; SHANETTA Y. CUTLAR,
INVESTIGATION OF THE PUERTO RICO POLICE DEPARTMENT (Sept. 5, 2011), http://www
.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/prpd_letter.pdf; JONATHAN M. SMITH & JENNY A.
DURKAN, INVESTIGATION OF THE SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT (Dec. 16, 2011), http://
www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/spd_findletter_12-16-11.pdf.
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nority populations, the reports were translated so that limited English-
speaking community members could read them more easily.175  Following
the issuance of the findings letters, Division lawyers and investigators re-
engaged stakeholders to discuss remedies before beginning negotiations
with the city and police officials.
Community engagement and civilian oversight were built into con-
sent decrees negotiated by the Civil Rights Division. For example, the
New Orleans, Louisiana, consent decree was designed to bring compre-
hensive reform to a department that was deeply troubled. The patterns of
violations included excessive force, discrimination against sexual assault
victims, discrimination based on gender identity, and illegal searches and
seizures.176 Prior to the decree, the community had very little information
on the practices of the department and had a very limited oversight role.
To leverage community engagement to address the patterns and practices
that violated the constitution, the agreement requires:
• The comprehensive collection and reporting of data. The New
Orleans Police Department must make public all of their reports
concerning the implementation of the agreement, all department
policies and procedures that do not implicate confidential practices,
and other data necessary “to facilitate and ensure transparency and
175. E.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., UNITED STATES’ INVESTIGATION
OF THE MARICOPA COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE (2011), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/
documents/mcso_findletter_espanol_12-15-11.pdf (Spanish translation); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERRIFF’S DEPARTMENT
STATIONS IN ANTELOPE VALLEY (2013), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/an-
telope_findings_spanish.pdf (Spanish translation); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV.,
INVESTIGATION OF THE EAST HAVEN POLICE DEPARTMENT (2011), http://www.justice.gov/
crt/about/spl/documents/ehpdfindspan.pdf (Spanish translation); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL
RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT (2011), http://
www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/nopd_letter_espanol.pdf (Spanish translation); U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT
(2011), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/nopd_letter_vietnamese.pdf (Vietnamese transla-
tion); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT (2015), http://www.justice.gov/crt/file/764731/download (Spanish translation);
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE NEWARK POLICE DEPART-
MENT (2014), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/npd_findings_spanish.pdf
(Spanish translation); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE
CLEVELAND DIVISION OF POLICE (2014), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/
cleveland_summary_span_12-4-14.pdf (Spanish translation); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL
RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE PUERTO RICO POLICE DEPARTMENT (2011), http://
www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/prpd_letter_espanol.pdf (Spanish translation).
176. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS
POLICE DEPARTMENT vi-xi (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/nopd_re
port.pdf.
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wide public access to information related to NOPD decision mak-
ing and activities.”177
• The collection of data and the issuance of an annual report regard-
ing civilian complaints.178
• The creation of a community outreach and public information
program that requires semi-annual meetings in each police
district.179
• An enhanced role for the Police-Community Advisory Board, an
already existing entity with the mission of providing feedback to
department leadership.180
• A community-based restorative justice project to “help remedy
mistrust between NOPD and the broader New Orleans commu-
nity and create an environment for successful problem-solving
partnerships.”181
• Increased support for the Office of the Independent Police Moni-
tor, an arm of the City’s Inspector General.182
• An annual community survey on attitudes about the police depart-
ment and police practices.183
In Seattle, Washington, in addition to other transparency and com-
munity oversight measures, the consent decree included the creation of the
Community Police Commission.184 The City and the Department of Jus-
tice agreed to the following:
• “Effective and constitutional policing requires a partnership be-
tween the Police Department, its officers, community members,
and public officials. The Parties are committed to developing re-
form strategies that will work for Seattle and leverage the unique
assets of all components of the community.”185
• “There is significant community interest in this reform effort. The
community is a critical resource. Certain aspects of the reform ef-
forts embodied in the Agreements are best developed by dialogue
and wide-spread input. Moreover, ongoing community input into
177. Consent Decree Regarding the New Orleans Police Department at 110-11, United
States v. City of New Orleans, No. 12-1924 (E.D. La. Jan. 11, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2013/01/11/nopd_agreement_1-11-13.pdf.
178. Id. at 110.
179. Id. at 111.
180. Id. at 112-13.
181. Id. at 113.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 67-68.
184. Settlement Agreement and Stipulated [Proposed] Order of Resolution at 6-8, United
States v. City of Seattle, No. 12-CV-1282 (W.D. Wash. Jul. 27, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2012/07/31/spd_consentdecree_7-27-12.pdf.
185. Id. at 6.
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the development of reforms, the establishment of police priorities,
and mechanisms to promote community confidence in SPD will
strengthen SPD and facilitate police/community relationships nec-
essary to promote public safety.”186
• “Police officers also bring an important voice to the reform pro-
cess. Their views, whether presented through their labor organiza-
tions or through other channels, should inform the development of
the reform effort and its implementation.”187
The Community Police Commission was charged in part with re-
viewing the monitor’s reports and was given the power to issue its own
reports on compliance.188 Significantly, the Community Police Commis-
sion participated in the development of the Seattle Police Department’s
new use of force policy. The Commission was the only civilian body in
the Nation to have a role in the formulation of a use of force policy. As
one scholar noted, “This outcome is the first time in American police
history where community representatives had a formal voice in the draft-
ing of police policies.”189
Different strategies have been employed in others cases. For example,
the Albuquerque, New Mexico, Police Department consent decree calls
for the creation of a formal Police Civilian Oversight Agency as one of
several community oversight provisions.190 The Oversight Agency has a
formal role in police officer discipline, but it also has a right to obtain a
wide variety of Police Department records and to meet with and obtain
information from police personnel191 and the authority to issue policy rec-
ommendations.192 To ensure that the recommendations receive meaning-
ful consideration, the agreement provides:
For any of the agency’s policy recommendations that the Chief
decides not to follow, or any concerns that the agency has re-
garding changes to policy that Chief finds unfounded, the
Chief shall provide a written report to the agency explaining
any reasons why such policy recommendations will not be fol-
lowed or why the agency’s concerns are unfounded.193
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 7.
189. Samuel Walker, Community Voice in Police Policy in Seattle, SAMUEL WALKER (Aug. 25,
2015), http://samuelwalker.net/2015/08/community-voice-in-police-policy-in-seattle/.
190. Settlement Agreement at 82-87, United States v. Albuquerque, No. 1:14-CV-1025
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Well before the current generation of Civil Rights Division consent
decrees, a community engagement model proved effective in Cincinnati,
Ohio. In litigation initiated by private litigants and later joined by the De-
partment of Justice, a “collaborative agreement” gave community groups a
powerful voice alongside a court-enforceable agreement.194 The collabora-
tive agreement not only required the implementation of a comprehensive
problem-solving policing strategy but also gave the community representa-
tives an active voice in the development of policies and trainings and in
measuring success.195  While implementation was not seamless, and the
City fell out of compliance at times,196 officers’ use of force declined sig-
nificantly and community perceptions of the department improved.197 The
final court monitor’s report concluded:
The Collaborative has been successful in laying a strong founda-
tion for police reform. . . . [T]he City made significant
changes in the way it polices Cincinnati. . . . In addition, efforts
to improve relations between the police department and the
community, particularly the African  American community, are
continuing. . . . The Parties’ performances under the Agree-
ments were initially halting and defensive. With time and the
emergence of impressive leadership throughout the Cincinnati
Community, significant compliance with the Agreements were
achieved resulting in the Cincinnati Collaborative being one of
the most successful police reform efforts ever undertaken in this
Country.198
194. Collaborative Agreement at 7-11, In re Cincinnati Policing, No. 1:99-cv-3170 (S.D.
Ohio).
195. Id. at 7-11.
196. See Decision and Recommendation, In re Cincinnati Policing, No. 1:99-cv-3170,
(S.D. Ohio Jan. 26, 2005).
197. SAUL A. GREEN & RICHARD B. JEROME, CITY OF CINCINNATI INDEPENDENT
MONITOR’S FOURTEENTH REPORT 2 (Sept. 1, 2006), http://www.acluohio.org/assets/issues/
PolicePractices/CincinnatiAgreement/2006_September_monitor_report.pdf (“Use of force by
Cincinnati police officers has changed significantly in the past four years. There has been a
significant decline in serious uses of force such as batons (PR-24s), physical strikes or punches, or
takedowns involving injury. The use of force statistics for the first quarter of 2006 continue to
reflect the substitution of the Taser for other kinds of use of force. There were 139 Taser deploy-
ments in this quarter, a slight increase in deployments from the previous quarter, which was the
lowest number of deployments since the Tasers were implemented throughout the Department.
The number of chemical sprays, physical force and takedowns has significantly decreased over the
past two years.”).
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MONITOR’S FINAL REPORT 1, 36, 55-56 (Dec. 2008), http://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/police/
linkservid/97D9709F-F1C1-4A75-804C07D9873DC70F/showMeta/0/.
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The success of the strategy employed in Cincinnati is a model that reform
advocates should look to in combination with or when federal govern-
ment involvement is not possible.199
The strategies applied in the cases discussed above are neither exclu-
sive nor unique. What is critical about each is that civilians have a mean-
ingful policy role and that the entire community has access to information
about police practices. Police must truly become democratic institutions
that are part of and governed by the communities they serve.
CONCLUSION
The operation of police departments is opaque, but that opacity is
neither necessary nor healthy in a democratic society. Accountability will
bring much needed trust between officers and the communities they serve,
and that trust will ensure both constitutional policing and public safety.
Officers and civilians will both be better off. Unfortunately, the courts
have declined to play a comprehensive role in effectively providing neces-
sary accountability.
The proposal to import the strategies utilized by the Civil Rights
Division into the development of public policy regarding policing does not
require writing on a blank slate. There is a long tradition of civilian over-
sight in the United States with more than 200 oversight agencies and a
national organization, the National Association of Civilian Oversight in
Law Enforcement (NACOLE).200 NACOLE has developed standards,
training, and a code of ethics for oversight bodies.201 The work of
NACOLE and others provides a foundation that can be built upon to in-
crease democratic control over policing and transparency.
In addition, states across the Nation have begun to mandate data col-
lection by statute. One study found that thirty of the fifty states prohibit
racial profiling in some form and mandate the collection and publication
of data.202 Many of these statutes have been criticized as ineffective.203 To
199. Alana Semuels, How to Fix a Broken Police Department, Reforms were slow to take hold in
Cincinnati, but when they did, they drove down crime while also reducing arrests, THE ATLANTIC (May
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393797/; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TAKING STOCK: REPORT FROM THE 2010 ROUNDTABLE ON
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USC § 14141) (Sept. 2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/234458.pdf.
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.org/about-us/ (last visited Dec. 15, 2015).
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1f2f_q4m6vwqi6.pdf.
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achieve greater transparency, these statutes should be amended to make the
requirement more robust and to collect a broader scope of information.
As a final note, courts are creatures of their times, and opinions are
influenced by the historical moment. The development of Fourth Amend-
ment law demonstrates the influence of what is happening in the broader
society. No greater evidence of the effect of changing community attitudes
on the courts can be found than the recent decision on same-sex mar-
riage.204 Had there not been a social movement and a well-orchestrated
state-by-state strategy, it is impossible to imagine the Supreme Court rul-
ing as it did. That lesson should not be lost on those protesting in the
streets for justice and accountability in policing. The influence of their
actions may not come quickly, but it will come. They may be a driving
force in rescuing the relevance of the Fourth Amendment for the protec-
tion of important individual rights.
204. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
